We present necessary and sufficient revealed preference conditions to verify whether a nite data set on nonlinear budget sets is consistent with the maximization of a quasi-concave utility function. Our results can be used to test for convexity of the underlying preference relation. We also show that in many settings, our conditions are easy to use in practical applications.
Any point where the indifference curves are convex rather than concave cannot be observed in a competitive market. Such points are shrouded in eternal darkness.
Samuelson 1958

Introduction
is study follows up on two important papers in the literature on revealed preference theory: Afriat (1967) and, more recently, Forges and Minelli (2009) . Both papers look at the testable implications of rational (i.e. utility maximizing) consumption behavior for a nite data set of consumption choices. Speci cally, they de ne testable implications in terms of revealed preference conditions, i.e. necessary and sufficient conditions that the data must satisfy to be rationalizable in terms of utility maximization. ese conditions also characterize the properties of utility functions that are consistent with such a data rationalization. Afriat (1967) considers consumption choices on linear budgets. His main results are summarized in Afriat's theorem, which is probably the single most important result in revealed preference theory. One of the most surprising implications of this theorem is that any nite data set on linear budgets is consistent with the maximization of a locally non-satiated utility function if and only if it is consistent with the maximization of an increasing and concave utility function. As such, it is impossible to reject quasi-concavity without rejecting the assumption of utility maximization. Essentially, this means that convexity of preferences is nontestable in the case of linear budgets. Forges and Minelli (2009) obtain revealed preference conditions for consistency with utility maximization under general (possibly nonlinear) budget sets. An important consequence of their characterization is that they loose the equivalence between consistency with the maximization of a utility function and consistency with the maximization of a quasi-concave utility function. In other words, the nontestability of quasi-concavity no longer applies under nonlinear budgets. is raises an interesting question: for the general budgets sets considered by Forges and Minelli, can we de ne revealed preference conditions that obtain a convex rationalization (i.e. rationalization by a quasi-concave utility function)?
e current paper lls this gap in the literature: we provide a general account of the revealed preference conditions for convex rationalizations of consumption data on nonlinear budgets. We not only provide a theoretical characterization of convex preferences for nite data sets, but we also de ne versions of our testable implications that are easy to use in practical applications. In what follows, we motivate the economic relevance of our research question, provide a brief summary of the related literature, and point out our main contributions.
Convex preferences and nonlinear budget sets. Quasi-concavity of the utility function or, equivalently, convexity of the preference relation, corresponds to diminishing marginal rates of substitution: in order to keep utility constant, a consumer is willing to sacri ce less and less of a certain good for xed increments of another good. Non-convexity of preferences implies that the demand correspondence is discontinuous. However, many results in economics rely on the assumption of (upper hemi-)continuity of the demand correspondence. For example, non-convex preferences lead to a failure of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. Next, non-convexities can lead to various kinds of market imperfections. For example, without convexity there need not exist an intersection of supply and demand curves. Further, convex preferences are crucial to de ne shadow prices, which are oen fundamental to the analysis of public goods and externalities in theories of optimal taxation, models of risk and ambiguity aversion, ... Given this revealed importance of convex preferences in the literature, one may have expected much attention for the testable implications of this assumption. However, the empirical demand literature is surprisingly silent on the issue. Afriat's theorem may provide one explanation. As indicated above, this result implies nontestability of convexity under linear budgets (for nite data sets). Another main explanation is probably the advent of duality theory. Currently, most empirical demand analysis departs from a speci cation of a cost function de ned for linear budget sets, which exists even if the underlying utility function is not quasi-concave. In this manner, quasi-concavity is no longer necessary to make individual demand analysis empirically applicable, at least when budget sets are assumed to be linear. Importantly, the above cited results only suggest that tests of convexity will be empirically idle in the case of linear budget sets. However, many economic decision situations are characterized by nonlinear budget sets. For example, nonlinear budgets prevail in labor supply settings where differentiated tax systems imply a nonlinear trade-off between leisure and consumption, in intertemporal consumption where different interest rates for borrowing and saving make a nonlinear exchange between current and future consumption, in game theoretic settings where individuals' behavior is mutually interdependent, and in models of household production without constant returns to scale. 4 ese examples directly motivate our research question, i.e. characterize the testable implications of convex rationalizations on nonlinear budget sets.
At this point, it is worth indicating that we also have two other important motivations to explore the testable implications associated with convex preferences. First, as touched upon above, at a theoretical level convex preferences are very useful for establishing duality in consumption. Basically, these duality results exploit separating hyperplane theorems, which require convexity of preferences. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, at an empirical level, if we maintain the assumption of convex preferences (because we cannot reject it), then we can conduct a more powerful analysis. For example, exploiting convexity of preferences can result in more precise forecasts of consumption behavior in new situations characterized by unobserved (nonlinear) budget sets. In this respect, our following analysis will also present practical tests of convex preferences, which effectively provide a direct basis for subsequent forecasting/counterfactual analysis. 5 Revealed preference conditions for nonlinear budgets. is paper ts in the literature on revealed preference tests for consumption behavior to be rationalizable by utility maximization under nonlinear budgets. In what follows we provide a brief account of some main results in this literature that are directly relevant for the current study. is will help us to subsequently indicate our own contributions. Matzkin (1991) considers two extensions of Afriat's theorem to nonlinear budget sets. e rst extension assumes that every budget set is co-convex (i.e. the complement of a convex set). Matzkin shows that the usual revealed preference conditions remain necessary and sufficient for the existence of a concave utility function that rationalizes the data. 6 e second extension assumes that ever budget set has a unique supporting hyperplane through the chosen bundle that contains the whole budget. Matzkin demonstrated that, if we replace the budget set by the half space de ned by this hyperplane, the data set is rationalizable by a concave utility function if and only if the usual revealed preference conditions are 4 See Forges and Minelli (2009) for examples of game theoretic settings involving nonlinear budgets, and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for other examples of decision situations characterized by nonlinear budgets.
5 See, for example, Varian (1982) for an extensive discussion on empirical forecasting/counterfactual analysis starting from revealed preference conditions in the context of consumer behavior (under linear budgets). is discussion is directly translated to our setting (with nonlinear budgets).
6 Actually, Matzkin (1991) focused on rationalizability by a strict concave utility function (see also Matzkin and Richter (1991) ). However, Matzkin's results are easily amendable to rationalizability by a (possibly non-strict) concave utility function. satis ed for these new 'virtual' (linear) budget sets. Interestingly, at the end of Section 3 we show that Matzkin's results are speci c instances of our main result. Forges and Minelli (2009) also considered data rationalization by a concave utility function in their setting with general budget sets (see also Section 2). Essentially, they showed that their revealed preference conditions guarantee the existence of a (quasi-)concave utility function (only) in a special case that corresponds to Matzkin (1991) 's second extension discussed above. 7 As such, we extend these authors' results by establishing testable conditions for convexity that also apply to budgets beyond this special case.
Further, Yatchew (1985) considers the case of rationalizability by a concave utility function when the budget set can be written as a nite union of polyhedral convex sets. He obtains a set of inequalities that are necessary and sufficient for consistency with a concave utility function. Unfortunately, these inequalities are difficult to use in practice because they are quadratic in unknowns and therefore not easily veri able. At the end of Section 4, we will discuss in more detail the differences between Yatchew's results and our own results. In particular, we will indicate that we obtain tests that are linear in the unknowns.
As a nal note, we indicate that a number of authors have looked at the problem of rationalizability by convex preferences in a more general choice theoretic setting, which is to be distinguished from the consumption setting (with nonlinear budget sets) on which we focus here. For example, Richter and Wong (2004) obtain testable restrictions such that a given preference relation over a nite set of bundles can be represented by a (strict) concave utility function, and Demuynck (2009) derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a convex preference relation in a general choice setting.
Our contributions. Our main result provides a full analogue of Afriat's original theorem for the case of general budgets (assumed to be closed and monotone; see Section 2). By generalizing Afriat's theorem, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a nite set of budgets and consumption bundles to be consistent with the maximization of a convex preference relation. Interestingly, these conditions turn out to be stronger than the ones that guarantee consistency with a utility function that is not necessarily quasi-concave, which directly implies that the property of convexity is separately testable if budgets are nonlinear.
In its most well known form, Afriat's theorem shows the equivalence between four consistency conditions for a given set of consumption data with linear budget sets: (i) consistency with the maximization of a utility function, (ii) consistency with a combinatorial condition known as  (generalized axiom of revealed preferences), (iii) feasibility of a set of linear inequalities, known as Afriat inequalities, and (iv) consistency with the maximization of a concave utility function. In Section 3, we provide our analogue of Afriat's theorem by showing equivalence between the following consistency conditions for data characterized by general (possibly nonlinear) budget sets: (i) consistency with the maximization of a quasi-concave utility function, (ii) consistency with a combinatorial condition that reduces to the standard  condition in the case of linear budgets, (iii) consistency with a set of linear inequalities that again reduce to the usual Afriat inequalities under linear budgets, and (iv) data consistency with the maximization of a concave utility function. At this point, it is worth remarking that the equivalence between (i) and (iv) actually implies that any data set rationalizable by a quasi-concave utility function 7 One notable difference between the results in Forges and Minelli (2009) and Matzkin (1991) is that Matzkin only gives a characterization in terms of a  condition while Forges and Minelli also provide an equivalent characterization in terms of Afriat inequalities (see Section 2 for formal introductions of the concepts  and Afriat inequalities). When we show that Matzkin's characterization is a special case of our general characterization (at the end of Section 3), we also directly obtain an equivalent characterization in terms of Afriat inequalities (as in Forges and Minelli). is also rationalizable by a concave utility function. us, as a side-product, we show that concavity and quasi-concavity are empirically indistinguishable even in the case of nonlinear budget sets.
In what follows, we will also show that our main result generalizes the existing results in the literature (cited above). Finally, we will indicate that our testable implications may be implemented through simple linear programming techniques. is enables an easy operationalization of our conditions, which is particularly useful in view of practical applications.
Outline. e remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by introducing Afriat's theorem (for linear budget sets) and the rationalizability result of Forges and Minelli (2009) (for nonlinear budget sets). Here, we show that Afriat's equivalence result breaks down in the case of nonlinear budgets. Section 3 then contains our main result, i.e. the analogue of Afriat's theorem for nonlinear budget sets. We also show that this result encompasses Matzkin (1991)'s results as special cases. Section 4 considers practical operationalizations of our testable conditions for convex rationalizations, and we relate this discussion to the study of Yatchew (1985) . Section 5 concludes. e Appendix contains the proofs of our main results.
Afriat's theorem and testability of convexity
In this section, we rst introduce some useful notation and de nitions. We then present Afriat's theorem. As indicated above, a main implication of this result is that convexity of preferences (or quasi-concavity of a rationalizing utility function) is nontestable under linear budget sets. Subsequently, we discuss the main theorem of Forges and Minelli (2009) and show that Afriat's nontestability result does not extend to nonlinear budget sets, which motivates our research question in Section 3.
Notation and de nitions
A data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T consists of a nite collection of subsets B t of R n + and elements x t ∈ B t . e intuition is that B t is a budget set, which contains all feasible consumption bundles of n goods at observation t ∈ T, while x t is the chosen consumption bundle from this set. We call (B t , x t ) an observation.
We impose two assumptions on any budget set B t . First of all, we require that B t is closed. In other words, all limits of sequences of bundles in B t are also in B t . is is a technical but generally uncontroversial assumption. Second, we assume that the sets B t are monotone. Formally, this implies for all x ∈ B t and all y ∈ R n + , if
Intuitively, this condition states that, when an individual can afford the bundle x, then she can also afford any bundle y ≤ x. 8 is assumption is satis ed if we assume that an individual can costlessly dispose of any amount of goods, i.e. y can be obtained by choosing x and throwing away the bundle x − y. As a nal note, we want to stress that we do not require our budget sets to be compact. As such, it is possible that budget sets are unbounded in some direction.
A bundle x ∈ B t is on the boundary ∂B t of B t if there is no other bundle y in B t that contains more of every good than the bundle x. Formally,
8 For two elements x, y ∈ R n + we have that x ≤ y if xi ≤ y i for each good i ≤ n, we have that x < y if x ≤ y and x ̸ = y and we write x ≪ y if xi < y i for all goods i.
A budget set B t is linear if there exists a price vector p t ∈ R n ++ and a budget m t ∈ R + such that B t contains bundles x of which the expenditure at prices p t does not exceed m t , Formally,
Observe that, for linear budget sets, the boundary of B t coincides with the budget hyperplane; ∂B t = {x ∈ R n + |p t x = m t }. If we de ne m t = p t x t , we automatically obtain that x t ∈ ∂B t . If all budgets are linear and m t = p t x t for all t ∈ T, we also denote such data set by {p t , x t } t∈T . is is the type of data set Afriat (1967) considered in his original study.
A utility function u : R n + → R associates with any conceivable bundle x ∈ R n + a real number u(x). We will consider the following properties of utility functions. A utility function u is concave if, for all x, y ∈ R n + and α
A utility function is quasi-concave if the better-than sets are convex. Formally, for all x, y and z ∈ R n + and α ∈ [0, 1], we have that
A function u is locally non-satiated if, for all bundles x ∈ R n + , there always exists a bundle arbitrarily close to x that has higher utility than x. Formally, for all open neighborhoods N of x, there always exists a bundle y in N ∩ R n + such that u(y) > u(x). We say that a function u is increasing if, for all x, y ∈ R n + , x ≫ y implies u(x) > u(y). Finally, a function u is continuous if, for all x ∈ R n + , the better-than sets {y ∈ R n + |u(y) > u(x)} and the worse-than sets {y ∈ R n
if u is increasing and continuous, then we also have that x ≥ y implies u(x) ≥ u(y).
A data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T is said to be rationalizable if there exists a utility function that makes the observations consistent with utility maximization.
De nition 1 (Rationalizability).
A data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T is rationalized by the utility function u : R n + → R if, for all t ∈ T, x t maximizes u(x) subject to the condition x ∈ B t , i.e.
Afriat's theorem
Building on the work of Afriat (1967) , Varian (1982) presents a combinatorial condition for rationalizability by a concave, increasing and continuous utility function when all budget sets B t are linear. Speci cally, the condition requires data consistency with the so-called generalized axiom of revealed preference or . Given our speci c focus, it is useful to formulate this  condition for a setting with general (possibly nonlinear) budget sets. e relation R in this de nition is called the revealed preference relation. e rst condition states that, if x t was chosen but x v was also available, then x t is revealed preferred to x v . For example, if budget sets are linear, we have x t Rx v whenever p t x t ≥ p t x v . e second condition requires the revealed preference condition to be transitive. In words, if x t is revealed preferred to x v and x v is revealed preferred to x s , then x t is also revealed preferred to x s . e third condition requires that when x t is revealed preferred to x v , then x t should not be in the interior of B v . Equivalently, if x t is revealed preferred to x v and x t ∈ B v , i.e. x t was available when x v was in fact chosen, then x t must be on the boundary of B v . In the case of linear budget sets, this requires p v x v ≤ p v x t whenever x t Rx v . Observe that for every chosen bundle x t we automatically have that x t Rx t . As such,  requires that each chosen bundle x t must be on the boundary of its own budget set B t , i.e. x t ∈ ∂B t .
De nition 2 (
We are now in a position to state Afriat's theorem (Varian (1982) , based on Afriat (1967) ). is result characterizes rationalizable data sets S in the case of linear budget sets. eorem 1 (Afriat's theorem) . Consider a data set S = {p t , x t } t∈T with linear budget sets. en, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) e data set S is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated and continuous utility function.
(ii) e data set S satis es .
(iii) For all t ∈ T, there exist numbers U t ≥ 0 and λ t > 0 such that, for all t, v ∈ T:
(iv) e data set S is rationalizable by an increasing, concave and continuous utility function.
e theorem shows that when budget sets are linear,  (statement (ii)) provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the data to be rationalizable by a concave, increasing and continuous utility function. Statement (iii) gives an equivalent condition in terms of so-called Afriat inequalities, which are linear in the unknown variables U t and λ t .
Afriat's theorem has a remarkable implication: data rationalizability by a non-satiated utility function (statement (i)) is equivalent to rationalizability by an increasing and concave utility function (statement (iv)). As such, the theorem shows that, if budget sets are linear, it is impossible to accept rationalizability by a non-satiated utility function while rejecting it for a concave and increasing utility function. Essentially, this means that, under utility maximization, the property of concavity of utility functions is nontestable in the case of linear budget sets.
Nonlinear budget sets
e picture changes drastically if budgets are nonlinear. In such a setting,  consistency remains necessary and sufficient for rationalizability by an increasing utility function, but it is no longer sufficient for rationalizability by a concave utility function. Forges and Minelli (2009) showed that  consistency is equivalent to rationalizability by an increasing utility function. To obtain this result, they considered the gauge function γ t : R n + → R n , de ned by,
In words γ t (x) gives for the smallest number for which x/γ t (x) belongs (or still belongs) to the budget set. In the case of linear budget sets, we obtain that γ t (x) = p t x/p t x t . 9 en, building on a result of Fostel, Scarf, and Todd (2004) , Forges and Minelli proved the following theorem.
eorem 2 (Forges and Minelli (2009)). Consider a data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T . en, the following statements are equivalent: (i) e data set S is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated and continuous utility function.
(iv) ere exist an increasing and continuous utility function that rationalizes the data set S.
ere is a clear correspondence between eorem 1 and eorem 2. However, a notable difference is that, for nonlinear budget sets, we loose the equivalence between rationalizability by an arbitrary (non-satiated) utility function and rationalizability by a concave utility function.
is last point is illustrated in Figure 1 , which presents two budget sets, given by the surfaces enclosed by ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , 0 and ℓ ′ 1 , ℓ ′ 2 , 0. e chosen bundles are represented by, respectively, the points x 1 and x 2 . It is easy to verify that this data set satis es . However, it is not rationalizable by a concave utility function, as we show by contradiction. Speci cally, let us assume that the observations are rationalizable by a concave utility function. en, because both budget sets are convex and the rationalizing utility function is concave, there must exist hyperplanes going through the chosen bundles that separate the corresponding budget sets from the better-than sets. As both budget sets are differentiable, these separating hyperplanes are uniquely de ned. In Figure 1 , these hyperplanes are given by the lines r 1 , r 2 and r ′ 1 , r ′ 2 . By construction, the areas below these hyperplanes contain bundles that have lower utility than the chosen bundles. As such, for any rationalizing (concave) utility function u, it must be that u(x 2 ) < u(x 1 ) and u(x 1 ) < u(x 2 ), which leads to the wanted contradiction.
us, we conclude that, in order to characterize rationalizability by a concave utility function under nonlinear budgets, we will have to modify the  condition. e next section addresses this issue.
Convex rationalizations on nonlinear budgets
is section establishes the characterization of data sets with nonlinear budgets that are rationalizable by convex preferences, i.e. there exists a rationalization by a quasi-concave utility function. A main ingredient of this characterization is the concept of co-convex hulls. We will rst introduce this concept, aer which we can de ne the associated notion of support sets. is will then allow us to state our main theorem, which de nes the revealed preference conditions for a convex rationalization on general (possibly nonlinear) budget sets. To conclude this section, we illustrate the generality of our characterization by showing that it specializes to Matzkin (1991)'s characterizations.
Co-convex hulls and support sets
A set H ⊆ R n + is co-convex if its complement R n + \ H is convex, i.e. for all x, y ∈ R n + such that x, y / ∈ H and all α ∈ [0, 1]: αx + (1 − α)y / ∈ H. Next, take any observation (B t , x t ) from a data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T . Intuitively, a co-convex hull of (B t , x t ) gives a speci c approximation of the set of bundles that are not better than x t (i.e. the complement of the better-than set of x t ). Formally, it is de ned as follows. . r 2 .
De nition 3 (co-convex hull). Consider a data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T . e set H t is a co-convex hull of an observation (B t , x t ) if it satis es the following properties:
ℓ ′
(i) H t is co-convex; (ii) H t is closed and monotone; (iii) B t ⊆ H t ; (iv) If
As explained above, the rst condition requires that the complement of H t is convex. e second condition imposes the same conditions on H t as on B t , i.e. closedness and monotonicity. e third condition requires that H t contains the budget set B t , which explains the use of the term 'hull' . Finally, the fourth condition assumes that H t does not contain any bundle that strictly dominates x t in all dimensions; this complies with the above interpretation of H t as approximating the complement of the better-than set of x t .
e following lemma makes clear that the concept of co-convex hulls is well-de ned for some observation (B t , x t ) if and only if x t belongs to the boundary of the budget set B t .
Lemma 1. Consider a data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T . e observation (B t , x t ) has a co-convex hull if and only if x t ∈ ∂B t .
In what follows, we will also use the concept of minimal co-convex hulls.
De nition 4 (Minimal co-convex hull). Consider a data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T . e set H t is a minimal co-convex hull of the observation (B t , x t ) if (i) H t is a co-convex hull of (B t , x t );
(ii) for any other co-convex hull H ′ t of (B t ,
e next lemma states that any observation with a co-convex hull also has a minimal co-convex hull. At this point, it is worth indicating that a minimal co-convex hull should not necessarily be unique.
Lemma 2. Consider a data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T . e observation (B t , x t ) has a minimal co-convex hull if and only if x t ∈ ∂B t .
It is well known that any closed and convex set can be written as the intersection of a collection of closed half spaces. 10 As a consequence, its complement, which is an open and co-convex set, can be written as a union of open half spaces. e following exposition provides an embodiment of this idea applied to co-convex hulls.
Consider a co-convex hull H t of (B t , x t ). By de nition, the complement of this set, i.e. R n + \ H t , is an open and convex set. As such, its closure can be written as the intersection of its supporting half spaces. An element x in such a half space then satis es a condition of the form
for some vector p i t ∈ R n and some number m i t ∈ R. Given that budget sets are monotone sets that are subsets of the positive orthant, we can assume, without loss of generality, that p i t ∈ R n + , p i t ̸ = 0 and m i t > 0. Moreover, any rescaling (αp i t , αm i t ) of (p i t , m i t ) represents the same half space and as such we can always normalize these half spaces by setting m i t = 1. Summarizing, there exists a set A t = {p i t ∈ R n + } of price vectors such that x is in the closure of R n + \ H t if and only if p i t x ≥ 1 for all p i t ∈ A t . e complement of the closed convex set R n + \ H t is thus given by bundles x ∈ R n + that satisfy min p i t ∈At p i t x < 1. is complement equals the interior of H t and therefore its closure is H t . is implies that H t consists of all bundles x with min p i t ∈At p i t x ≤ 1. As a consequence, the boundary ∂H t can be de ned by the bundles x for which min p i t ∈At p i t x = 1. In the following, we will abuse terminology and call A t the support set of the co-convex hull H t .
A general result
Our main theorem characterizes data sets for which there exists a convex rationalization, i.e. the data set is rationalizable by a quasi-concave utility function (or, equivalently, convex preferences).
eorem 3. Consider a data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T . en, the following statements are equivalent: (i) e data set S is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated, quasi-concave and continuous utility function.
(ii) For all t ∈ T, there exists a minimal co-convex hull H t of (B t , x t ) such that the set {H t , x t } t∈T satis es .
(iii) For all t ∈ T, there exists a minimal co-convex hull H t of (B t , x t ) with associated support set A t , and there exist numbers U t ≥ 0 and λ t > 0 such that, for all t, v ∈ T:
) .
(iv) e data set S is rationalizable by an increasing, concave and continuous utility function.
is theorem clearly mirrors Afriat's theorem. e main difference in statement (ii) of eorem 3 is that it requires  consistency not in terms of the observed budget sets but in terms of a collection of minimal co-convex hulls. As indicated above, a minimal co-convex hull of (B t , x t ) should not be uniquely de ned in general and, therefore, verifying statement (ii) of eorem 3 can be considerably more difficult than verifying  for the original data set {B t , x t } t∈T . Statement (iii) gives a set of corresponding Afriat inequalities in terms of the support sets of the minimal co-convex hulls. Below, we will show that these inequalities reduce to the usual Afriat inequalities in the case of linear budget sets. More generally, in Section 4 we point out a number of speci c cases in which the inequalities in statement (iii) become linear in unknowns, which is useful for practical applications. At this point, we indicate that, conditional on the minimal co-convex hulls, the 'generalized' Afriat inequalities in statement (iii) of eorem 3 are linear in the unobservable variables U t and λ t . A nal important observation is that the equivalence between statements (i) and (iv) implies that it is impossible to verify concavity separately from quasi-concavity, even if we allow for nonlinear budget sets.
One nal remark is in order. Statements (ii) and (iii) of eorem 3 require the co-convex hulls H t to be minimal. However, it is easy to verify in the theorem's proof that the result also holds if we consider any co-convex hull rather than a minimal one. is gives the following equivalence result. 11 Corollary 1. Consider a data set S = {B t , x t } t∈T . en, the following statements are equivalent: 
(
ii) For all t ∈ T, there exists a co-convex hull H t of (B t , x t ), with associated support set A t , such that the set {H t , x t } t∈T satis es  or, equivalently, there exist numbers U t ≥ 0 and λ t
We have chosen to state eorem 3 in its current form because the set of minimal co-convex hulls is the smallest set of co-convex hulls for which our theorem holds. is effectively makes that the theorem provides the sharpest formulation of the rationalizability conditions: in principle, it suffices to (only) consider the minimal co-convex hulls when verifying rationalizability. 12 However, the result in Corollary 1 is a useful one from a practical point of view. It allows us to conclude that there exists a convex rationalization of some data set as soon as we can nd one speci cation of co-convex hulls (not necessarily minimal) that satis es the conditions in statement (ii) of Corollary 1. Moreover, and important for the sequel, the equivalence in Corollary 1 will be directly useful for de ning operational tests of rationalizability in Section 4.
Special cases
As indicated in the Introduction, Matzkin (1991) considers two extensions of Afriat's theorem to nonlinear budget sets. e rst extension assumes that every budget set is co-convex. e second extension assumes that every budget set has a unique supporting hyperplane through the chosen bundle that contains the budget in one of the half spaces de ned by this hyperplane. In what follows, we will show that eorem 3 captures Matzkin's characterizations as limiting cases, and we use this to subsequently show that our general result reduces to Afriat (1967) 's original conditions in the case of linear budget sets.
Co-convex budget sets.. If the budget set B t is co-convex and x t ∈ ∂B t , then one can easily verify that B t is the unique minimal co-convex hull of (B t , x t ). As a consequence, we obtain the following corollary, which follows from combining eorems 2 and 3.
Corollary 2. Consider a data set S = {B t , x t } and assume that every budget set B t is co-convex. en, the following statements are equivalent:
where for all t ∈ T, A t is the support set of B t .
(iv) e data set is rationalizable by an increasing, concave and continuous utility function.
is characterization coincides with Matzkin's rationalizability characterization except that it includes an additional characterization in terms of Afriat inequalities (statement (iii)).
Convex budget sets.
In a second setting, Matzkin assumed that every budget set B t has a unique supporting hyperplane at x t that contains the entire budget set in one of the half spaces de ned by this hyperplane. As indicated in the Introduction, the same setting was considered by Forges and Minelli (2009) . Under the stated assumptions, it is easy to verify that there is a unique minimal co-convex hull of the observation (B t , x t ), which is de ned by the half space produced by the (unique) supporting hyperplane. en, applying eorem 3 to this case, we directly obtain Matzkin's result, which we again extend by adding a characterization in terms of Afriat inequalities (see also Forges and Minelli (2009, Proposition 4 
)).
Linear budget sets. To conclude, given that linear budget sets are co-convex by construction, we can also show that Corollary 2 complies with Afriat's theorem in the case of linear budget sets. More speci cally, for linear budget sets the support set A t consists of a single element, i.e. the normalized price vector p t /m t . us, the inequalities in statement (iii) of Corollary 2 reduce to the standard Afriat inequalities: 
Practical tests
e general result in eorem 3 is essentially a theoretical one. It does not provide guidelines for testing the revealed preference conditions in speci c applications. In this section, we consider the operationalization of the conditions. We show that verifying our testable implications for convex rationalizations boils down to checking linear inequalities when assuming that budget sets can be written as nite unions of polyhedral convex sets. Importantly, we note that this assumption is not restrictive from an applied point of view, as we can always approximate any budget set arbitrarily close as a union of polyhedral convex sets.
To facilitate our exposition, we rst consider the limiting case where each budget set is represented as a single polyhedral convex set. Subsequently, we generalize towards budget sets characterized as nite unions of polyhedral convex sets.
Polyhedral convex sets
A budget set is polyhedral convex if it can be written as the intersection of a nite number of half spaces. Formally, we have that B t is polyhedral convex if there exists a nite set K t = {q i t ∈ R n + } such that
We can now verify the next result.
Lemma 3. Consider a data set S = {B t , x t }. If B t is polyhedral convex and H t is a minimal co-convex hull of the observation
(B t , x t ), then H t = {x ∈ R n + |p t x ≤ 1}, where p t
is a convex combination of the vectors q
is characterization of minimal co-convex hulls allows for an efficient operationalization of the characterization in eorem 3 under polyhedral convex budget sets. To see this, consider the collection of half spaces H t such that, for all H t ∈ H t , there exist numbers α i t ∈ R + , with ∑ |Kt| i=1 α i t = 1, and
Every element of the collection H t is clearly a co-convex hull of (B t , x t ). Moreover, from above we know that H t contains all minimal co-convex hulls of (B t , x t ). So, applying Corollary 1 to this setting gives the following result. 
Corollary 3. Consider a data set S = {B
Conclusion
We have generalized Afriat's theorem by providing a revealed preference characterization for convex rationalizations on nonlinear budget sets. is establishes the testable implications associated with rationalizing consumption behavior by a quasi-concave utility function (i.e. convex preferences). Interestingly, we also showed that, in practice, the conditions for convex rationalizations are efficiently veri able in that they only require checking a nite number of inequalities that are linear in unknowns.
We see different possible applications of our theoretical results. First of all, our characterizations allow us to verify if utility functions can be assumed to be quasi-concave. is can proceed in two steps. First, we verify  consistency for the data set {B t , x t } t∈T . Subsequently, we then additionally check whether this data set satis es the revealed preference conditions in eorem 3. If the data pass the rst test but fail the second, then they are rationalizable by an increasing utility function (see eorem 2) but not by a quasi-concave one. is test can be particularly useful to check the empirical validity of economic models that heavily rely on convex preferences.
More generally, our characterizations could also be used to verify rationalizability of consumption behavior in the case of nonlinear budget sets. As indicated in the Introduction, prime examples concern labor supply, intertemporal consumption, models of household production and speci c game theoretic situations. In this respect, our characterization of convex rationalizations not only allows for simply testing rationalizability. It also forms a useful basis for addressing recovery and forecasting questions under the maintained assumption of quasi-concave utility. See, for example, Varian (1982) for a detailed discussion on recovery and forecasting analysis based on Afriat's theorem (for linear budget sets). His analysis is readily translated to our setting.
there must exist bundles x t , x v such that x t Rx v , x v ∈ H t and x v / ∈ ∂H t . is implies that u(x t ) ≥ u(x v ) and, by Lemma 5, u(x t ) > u(x v ), which gives a contradiction.is contradiction shows that (i) implies (ii). ) .
(ii)→(iii
is shows that (ii) implies (iii).
(iii)→(iv).. e function γ t (y) = min pt∈At p t y − 1 takes the minimum over a set of affine and increasing functions. is function is concave, increasing and continuous by construction. Observe that, for all t ∈ T, γ t (x t ) = 0 and, if y ∈ B t , then γ t (y) ≤ 0. Now, de ne the function u such that u(y) = min t∈T U t + λ t γ t (y).
As u is the minimum over a nite set of concave, increasing and continuous functions, it is also concave, increasing and continuous. We still have to show that u rationalizes the data set S. Let y ∈ B t , which implies that γ t (y) ≤ 0. en, u(y) ≤ U t + λ t γ t (y)
is shows that u rationalizes the data set S, i.e. (iii) implies (iv).
(iv)→(i).. is is trivial.
Proof of Lemma 3
As a preliminary step, because the observation (B t , x t ) has a minimal co-convex hull H t , we can use x t ∈ ∂B t . en, let P t represent the set of all p t that are convex combinations of the vectors q t ∈ K t such that q t x t = 1, i.e. each p t ∈ P t de nes a supporting hyperplane of B t at x t . It is easy to verify that, for any p t ∈ P t , the set H t = {x ∈ R n + |p t x ≤ 1} is co-convex, i.e. it satis es the four properties in De nition 3. Now, consider a co-convex hull H ′ t such that H ′ t ̸ = {x ∈ R n + |p t x ≤ 1} for any p t ∈ P t . To obtain Lemma 3 it suffices to prove that H ′ t is not a minimal co-convex hull. We obtain this conclusion if H t ⊆ H ′ t (and H t ̸ = H ′ t by construction) for H t = {x ∈ R n + |p t x ≤ 1} with p t ∈ P t . To show this last point, we rst note that, because H ′ t is a co-convex hull of the observation (B t , x t ), there exists a hyperplane that separates B t and the complement of H ′ t at x t . en, because this separating hyperplane supports B t at x t , it corresponds to a set {x ∈ R n + |p t x = 1} for some p t ∈ P t . For this p t , we have H ′ t ⊇ {x ∈ R n + |p t x ≤ 1}, which gives the wanted result.
